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Jonathan Simon 
ABSTRACT—For those struggling with criminal justice reform today, the 
long history of failed efforts to close the gap between the promise of legal 
equality and the practice of our police forces and prison systems can seem 
mysterious and frustrating. Progress has been made in establishing stronger 
rights for individuals in the investigatory and sanctioning stages of the 
criminal process; yet, the patterns of over-incarceration and police 
violence, which are especially concentrated on people of color, have 
actually gotten worse during the same period. Seen in terms of its deeper 
history however, the carceral state is no longer puzzling: it has always 
governed more by norms of controlling abnormality than enforcing laws 
and, in the United States, this construct of abnormality has for centuries 
been deeply raced. If this is the right time to be optimistic about criminal 
justice reform, it is at least in part because the irrepressible emphasis on 
race by the agents of the carceral state has become more visible and its 
clash with American legal values less ignorable. 
AUTHOR—Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law, University of California 
Berkeley School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. carceral state has achieved global notoriety for its extremity. 
Comparative scholars of punishment and society have pointed to a variety 
of important structural and historical features of the United States that 
might account for this, including its early and high degree of democracy,1 
the localized and fragmented nature of government in the United States,2 
the high degree of market orientation in preferences for government,3 and 
our history as a settler colonial and slave society in which racial othering 
has remained a central axis of privilege and coercion.4 In this Essay, I will 
focus on the racial underpinnings of the carceral state. Race is the most 
consequential of these features, as it shapes the distinctively punitive and 
degrading nature of the U.S. carceral state. It is also, in my opinion, the 
most vulnerable to transformative change in the near term.  
One signal of this is the striking resonance of the Black Lives Matters 
Movement with a near majority of white Americans and a majority of 
white millennials.5 Another signal is the eagerness of many criminal justice 
1 KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2004); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). 
2 Nicola Lacey & David Soskice, Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United States: The 
Paradox of Local Democracy, 17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 454 (2015). 
3 DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ FAIRE
UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW (2016). 
4 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); ANDREW DILTS, PUNISHMENT AND INCLUSION (2014); 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). 
5 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON VIEWS OF RACE AND INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE 
WORLDS APART 14–15 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/
ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP4P-FKR6]. Despite the title, the fact 
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leaders and elected officials to champion reform of the system.6 With 
striking evidence of racial disproportionality in all aspects of its operations, 
the U.S. carceral state confronts an acute deficit, or even crisis, of 
legitimacy. This crisis is made starker by historically low levels of crime.7 
If the carceral state cannot stand up to scrutiny even under the weak “color-
blind” standard of equality that prevails in contemporary constitutional law 
and politics, and is not able to escape sustained demands for change 
through political fear over rising crime rates as it did in the 1960s, we may 
be able to achieve an historic realignment that will bring the carceral state 
back in line with global democratic norms for the extent of punishment and 
the protection of human rights.  
In this Essay, I explore the “twinning” of the carceral state between its 
legal penal sphere and its police/prison sphere, which is a universal feature 
of the modern carceral state.8 I examine how, in the United States, this has 
been marked from the start by the fact of slavery and the creation of 
“whiteness” as a citizenship property of some Americans.9 This white 
that a near majority of whites say they support the Black Lives Matter Movement is far more significant 
than that a substantial gap exists between whites and blacks. 
6 Recent examples abound of large city district attorneys embracing the need to reform the criminal 
justice system and do something about its race-based practices as well as others who have lost elections 
to reformers who would. See, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS WITH JOAN O’C. HAMILTON, SMART ON CRIME 
(2009); Emily Bazelon, Kamala Harris, a ‘Top Cop’ in the Era of Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/magazine/kamala-harris-a-top-cop-in-the-
era-of-black-lives-matter.html [https://perma.cc/K5UR-F35Y] (discussing reform ambitions of former 
San Francisco District Attorney and California Attorney General and now Senator Kamala Harris); 
Steve Schmadeke, Kim Foxx Promises ‘New Path’ of Transparency as Cook County State’s Attorney, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-states-
attorney-met-20161201-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZGB2-YVCF]. See generally Jonathan Simon, 
Beyond Tough on Crime: Towards a Better Politics of Prosecution, in PROSECUTORS AND 
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Maximo Langer & David Sklansky eds., forthcoming 2018) 
(discussing the reform trend among prosecutors and the ideas that are replacing “tough on crime” 
verities of the recent past). 
7 Between 1993 and 2015, violent crime victimizations declined from 79.8 to 18.6 per 1,000 
persons age 12 or older. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2LM-5RZP]; Lori Robertson, Dueling Claims on Crime 
Trend, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 13, 2016), http://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/dueling-claims-on-crime-
trend/ [https://perma.cc/PY73-7HSZ].  
8 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, ON THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE,
1972–1973 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2015). In the next Section, I will develop 
Foucault’s account of this “twinning” of penal and penitential. For the most part we see this everywhere 
a modern state administration of justice has developed. The penal law is established in the first instance 
by state or national legislatures and in the second through their interpretation or application by state or 
national courts. But beyond this legal sphere, there has been since the end of the eighteenth century a 
growing coercive system of policing and imprisonment that is authorized by the law—and in theory 
“enforces” that law—but is barely regulated by the law. 
9 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1725–28 (1993). 
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background (not white people exclusively, but a form of privilege 
originally associated with white European settlers in distinction from 
indigenous, or slave populations) has framed the direct threats of slave 
uprising, Native American resistance to dispossession, and competition 
from Mexican citizens absorbed by the conquest of northern Mexico and in 
the West by immigration from China and Japan. The American carceral 
state in its inception was (and remains today) inseparable from these 
colonial projects.  
Because the carceral state is a state, the meaning of citizenship is 
always of great consequence. The Civil War and Reconstruction created a 
singular national citizenship formally blind as to race.10 Since the end of 
Reconstruction, the modern American state has normalized ongoing racial 
othering largely by transforming its operation from the legal state to the 
less visible administrative state, and especially, the nearly invisible carceral 
state. 
The abnormal is the “twin” of crime in the modern carceral state.11 If 
the crime is something that state lawyers must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt,12 abnormality is the judgment made by police and correctional 
agents with no minimal legal burdens.13 This gap in the law and its 
administration created by the twinning of criminal law on the one hand, and 
the apparatus of police/prison power in the modern carceral state on the 
other, has, in the United States, been profoundly distorted by the racialized 
othering of colonial dispossession, slavery, and their afterlives. The broad 
principle of legality, which arose in the late eighteenth century and which 
the United States shares with the European legal systems and their global 
extensions, constitutes the central principle of legitimacy for democratic 
10 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988). 
11 MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1974–1975 (Graham 
Burchell trans., 2004). 
12 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–21 (1979). 
13 To fully discuss the legal doctrines that support this claim would require a law review article if 
not a treatise in its own right. The qualified immunity of police and correctional officers protects them 
from liability for violating all but the most clearly established constitutional rights in the most flagrant 
ways. The jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (finding 
the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment applicable to state courts), has ostensibly 
sought to regulate police searches and seizures with a catalog of exceptions, most of them premised on 
judicial deference to police expertise. See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017). Exemplary of the significance of this deference and its elevation of the 
carceral state and its agents over the legal state and its agents, was Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
(finding that a compulsory investigatory stop and physical “frisk” of a person reasonable if the stop was 
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement and the frisk was based on a reasonable 
suspicion of a weapon being present). In dissent, Justice William Douglas pointed out that the majority 
had held in effect that “the police have greater authority to make a ‘seizure’ and conduct a ‘search’ than 
a judge has to authorize such action.” Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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extensions, constitutes the central principle of legitimacy for democratic 
criminal justice systems as well as its engine of reform in many periods.14 
Of course, from the beginning, reform everywhere has been offset by the 
power of the twinned carceral state and its alternative principle of 
abnormality. In the United States, however, this uneasy fusion of the legal 
and carceral states was uniquely deformed by whiteness in several broad 
features that have facilitated U.S. penal exceptionalism including15: our 
commitment to maximum discretion in the agents of the carceral state;16 the 
institutionalization of the carceral state at the local level of government 
(while harnessing the resources of the state and occasionally the national 
government to local ends) which assures that discretion will promote racial 
hierarchy;17 limited judicial oversight; and a deeper embrace of scientific 
racism at the turn of the twentieth century than any other democracy.18  
Today, after decades of being cloaked by the war on crime, the racial 
nature of the U.S. carceral state has become strikingly visible and 
illegitimate to a growing number of Americans (including white 
Americans). For example, 49% of Americans (76% of blacks and 45% of 
whites) say that the criminal justice system is biased against blacks in a 
2016 survey, compared to 33–38% in the 1993, 2008, and 2013 surveys.19 
For the first time in decades we have the opportunity to reconsider what our 
14 See Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 
275–307 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (describing the legality principle as a 
driving force of criminal justice reform during periods of expanding democratization). 
15 For an interpretive exploration of the differences between European and U.S. penal cultures and 
the major explanations for the divergence, see Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. 
L. REV. 933 (2016). European legality faced its own distinctive aberration in colonialism, but in
externalizing this racial deepening of abnormality to the colonies, Europe may have been able produce a
stronger legality principle at home—one that finds fruit today in the strong force of human rights law in
the penal field. See generally WHITMAN, supra note 1.
16 This commitment was expressed most relevantly by Justice Lewis Powell in his opinion for the 
Court upholding the Georgia capital sentencing system against a statistically based equal protection 
challenge showing a race-of-victim effect that was both statistically significant and of large magnitude: 
“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear 
proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
297 (1987) (emphasis added). 
17 See generally NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008) (explaining that the fragmented nature of 
American criminal justice promotes penal extremism). 
18 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING 
OF NAZI RACE LAW (2017). 
19 Frank Newport, Public Opinion Context: Americans, Race and Police, GALLUP (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/193586/public-opinion-context-americans-race-
police.aspx [https://perma.cc/WG6X-D5AB]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1630 
carceral state would look like without whiteness as a constitutive 
background consideration.20  
This Essay first offers a brief history of how the carceral state in 
America became so deeply raced. It then considers the current conjuncture: 
one in which the combination of rising support for racial justice 
movements, widespread consensus that the carceral state is racially 
discriminatory, low crime rates, and growing support for noncriminal 
solutions to social problems offers the opportunity to fundamentally 
rebalance the relationship between the carceral state and legal state and 
promote a more equal and inclusive society. 
I. HOW THE ABNORMAL BECAME RACED:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CARCERAL STATE
Focusing on the carceral state forces us to recognize that we are 
talking about government when we talk about criminal justice. We are not 
simply observing some peculiar dispute among individuals into which the 
state as prosecutor is inevitably drawn by concerns over the public’s well-
being and morality.21 That is helpful because the carceral state is very hard 
to see (unless it is in your face). While especially true if you are a lawyer 
(or judge), it is also true if your exposure to criminal law is mostly through 
television courtroom dramas. In this view, of which our courts are much 
enamored, the government is composed of legislatures, executives, and 
courts, all very visible and some of it transparent to electoral democracy. 
Nevertheless, it is sometimes acknowledged that a vast administrative state 
has grown around executives and judges.22 This administrative state, 
moreover, is far more influential over how we are governed as individuals 
and communities than those more visible and celebrated institutions of 
democracy and the rule of law. Few of us will ever stand before a judge, 
20 It is tempting to view the election of Donald Trump, who as a candidate made a point of 
sounding as bellicose as possible on crime and as supportive as possible for the carceral state, as 
discounting substantially the chances for reform. However, while important in accelerating existing 
trends, the federal government accounts for a relatively small part of the carceral state. See generally 
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL 
REFORM (2017). 
21 R v. Dudley and Stephens involved a murder conviction for a killing for cannibalism by sailors 
under extreme deprivation after a shipwreck. [1884] 14 Q.B. 273 (Eng.). Although an English case, it 
has been taught to many generations of American law students in introducing criminal law and 
exemplifies this view of “criminal justice.” On the common origins of the U.S. and English carceral 
states see Jonathan Simon, Uncommon Law: America’s Excessive Criminal Law & Our Common-Law 
Origins, 143 DAEDALUS 62 (2014). 
22 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1st ed. 1969); 
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1618 (1986) (explaining that taken for 
granted in judicial acts are the organized systems of violence that carry them out). 
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but many will be stopped by police officers (and when we are that 
experience is likely to be strikingly racialized).23 If the administrative state 
is the “dark matter” of the modern legal state—making up the great bulk of 
actual regulation of economy and society invisible if largely intelligible to 
the principles of legality—the carceral state is the darkest region of the 
administrative state, even less visible to the public, and even less subjected 
to legal norms through the operation of court review and legislation.24 
Operating on the lowest status people in society, located mostly at the state 
and local level (which we tend to pay less attention to anyway), and mostly 
unelected, the carceral state is only forced into public attention at moments 
of collective violence. 
Perhaps because the carceral state is so much less visible and 
accountable to public normative expectations, it has evolved more slowly 
in some respects than other aspects of the administrative state, let alone the 
legal state. We are using basic technologies of governance introduced 
mostly in the first half of the nineteenth century—the prison, uniformed 
police apparatuses of semi-military violence—and little has fundamentally 
changed (although more has been added on, as we shall see). This is 
especially true with respect to the nation’s complex “progress” toward 
equal dignity for all citizens regardless of racialization or queerness. When 
we look at our carceral state, it is like we are looking at a part of our 
political and social past. But, unlike some ancient supernova spotted in the 
Hubble Space Telescope, these outdated institutions, imbued with race and 
identity, are coexisting with us. Thus, the carceral state, deeply marked by 
racial othering and the privileging of whiteness in its foundations, has ever 
since lagged the legal state to which it is formally bound in its regard for 
equal dignity of all citizens.  
The consequences of this may become clearer if we compare the 
United States to Europe.25 Both created the modern carceral state of police 
and prisons around the same moment, 1780–1830.26 In both, this took place 
simultaneously with the centralization of criminal law authority in 
23 See CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER:
HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
24 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 15–16 (2017). 
25 This has been a fruitful strategy in analyzing the American carceral state. See, e.g., DAVID 
GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); 
WHITMAN, supra note 1. 
26 See FOUCAULT, supra note 11. On the prison in the United States, see REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, 
THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE 
1776–1941 (2008). On police in the United States, see MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: 
PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005) (describing a broad 
expansion in the police power, including urban police departments in response to the revolution). 
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legislatures and subordinated courts.27 Sometimes described as the “legality 
principle,” this centralization is known best as a limit on the state’s power 
to punish, and is enshrined in constitutional provisions such as the ban ex 
post facto laws, in the due process vagueness doctrine, and in the bar on 
prospective application of criminal definitions expanded by judicial 
opinion (even though it corresponds to a great increase in the practical 
power of the criminal law). However, the aspiration of public law to 
regulate the authority of the criminal law had little practical application to 
the operation of the police and the penitentiary, which—over the course of 
the nineteenth century—formed the less visible foundations of the carceral 
state. In theory, these carceral organs are also creatures of the legislatures 
with the courts as the point of control. Thus the power of the police is, in 
principle, nothing but an extension of the legal authority of the legislature 
to be ultimately affirmed or not by the courts; likewise, nobody goes to 
prison, generally speaking, but through the order of court, or even to jail 
without the relatively prompt review of a court.  
But, as students of the carceral state have rediscovered in every 
generation, theory and reality do not match.28 For example, police decide 
which laws to enforce. Furthermore, police have near complete discretion 
to stop anybody because of broad terms of many criminal offense 
definitions and the huge penumbra of inaccuracy sanctioned by the concept 
of reasonable suspicion.29 Prisoners in the United States are almost to a 
person held under a legally imposed sentence.30 However, their actual 
conditions of confinement—including extended periods of solitary 
confinement in total isolation conditions common to supermax-style 
27 Perhaps the leading exponent of this in the Anglophone world, and heavily influential on 
American thinkers, was Jeremy Bentham, whose prominent works on the “science of legislation” in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century described a system of legislative authority and judicial 
fealty to legislated law. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL 
THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 220 (1989) (describing Bentham’s advocacy of legislative 
supremacy and his criticism of common law). 
28 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN 
CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016). 
29 As long as the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion they can subject anyone to at 
least a stop, even the crime for which the police are stopping them is a mere pretext to allow an 
investigation of another crime. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–19 (1996). 
30 Margo Schlanger, Differences Between Jails and Prisons 42 (2003) (unpublished essay prepared 
for Prisons Seminar, Harvard Law School), https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/
margoschlanger/Documents/Resources/The_Difference_Between_Jails_and_Prisons%20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5L2D-696H] (contrasting jails, which house pretrial defendants, with prisons, which 
house mostly long-term felony offenders). 
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prisons in the United States—is a function almost totally controlled by the 
correctional bureaucracy.31 
At the center of this complex of legal and carceral power formed at 
the end of the eighteenth century in both Europe and the United States is a 
“twinned” subject whose double nature elides reform of criminal justice 
from one generation to another.32 One twin is the criminal law violator; the 
citizen who, having broken the social contract, is considered the proper 
target of retributive communal anger and the proper instrument to deter 
others. This twin is in the grip of the legal state, held or bailed, subjected to 
trial by jury, and only if found guilty of all the essential facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, subjected to punishment. It is this twin, enshrined in the 
constitutional promise of due process onto which a series of legal rights has 
been attached—first against the federal government, and later, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s extension of that phrase, against the states—to 
the broad array of criminal defendants in the twentieth century.  
But when we leave the sphere of the courts and enter into those less 
visible spaces of the carceral state (policing and punishment) to which, as 
we have seen, it has been attached since the end of the eighteenth century, 
we find that the law violator was only the momentary guise of another kind 
of subject.33 This other subject, the twin of the law violator for the legal 
state, is the abnormal subject. The abnormal may be a citizen, or they may 
not be. They may be a law violator, or they may not be (yet). But it is not 
their violation of the social contract that brings them into the surveillance 
and control of the carceral state. Rather, the carceral state reaches out to 
touch them because of their abnormality, i.e., those traits or features that 
stand out as in some degree monstrous, aberrational, and above all 
dangerous.34 Here the due process and rights so central to the state’s 
handling of the criminal violator can be dispensed with. Most of the 
coercion exercised on the abnormal subject will be done outside the domain 
of courts altogether, in interactions between citizens and police on streets 
or buses,35 in schools,36 or prison solitary units.  
31 KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT (2016). 
32 FOUCAULT, supra note 11. 
33 I am borrowing Marx’s famous contrast between the sphere of circulation, where values like 
contract, property, and liberty, dominate, and what he calls the sphere of production, where coercive 
control by the owner of capital over the seller of labor power prevails. See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A 
CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 6 (Friedrich Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling 
trans., Lawrence & Wishart 1974) (1887). 
34 See FOUCAULT, supra note 11. 
35 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld searches by drug enforcement police who have 
stopped and boarded public buses for the purpose of identifying possible drug couriers and subjecting 
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When the highest authorities of the modern legal state acknowledge 
the carceral state and all the power it exercises over the abnormal subject at 
all, it is to gloss over or simply ignore the differences in the principles that 
guide the conjoined apparatuses of government. A good example on the 
penal side of the carceral state is the noble principle of proportionality that 
informs the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” 
and authorizes courts to overturn penal sentences that are “grossly 
disproportionate.”37 This principle might have some power if the purposes 
of punishment were limited to the purposes recognized by the generations 
that forged the legality principle, namely retribution and deterrence (with 
their internal self-limiting commitments).38 However in the forging of the 
modern criminal law those ends were merged with two additional penal 
rationales born at the end of the nineteenth century and infused with 
eugenics and scientific racism, namely rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
These rationales would have been unrecognized by the great philosophers 
of the classical criminal law like Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, and 
their legality principle,39 and instead express the core motivations of the 
carceral state to identify and arrest abnormality and to cure or contain it if it 
threatens society.40 The result of this unacknowledged merging of legal and 
them to a seat-side public request to examine their bags as potentially consensual. Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429 (1991) (overturning a per se rule against bus searches); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194 (2002) (overturning a per se rule requiring that officers advise passengers of their rights during bus 
searches). 
36 Criminalization often begins in schools. VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF
BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011). The Supreme Court has held that school staff may search students 
without a warrant and with reasonable suspicion (rather than probable cause), New Jersey v. TLO, 
469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985), or in some circumstances (athletes and competitive school organization 
participants) suspicionless searches in the form of drug tests, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
37 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (“Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”). 
38 It is retribution and deterrence that defined ends of the criminal law from the middle of the 
eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century and still dominate its legal philosophizing. 
The Constitution placed them as a limit on the other purposes of punishment. The late Justice Antonin 
Scalia made this point in part of his concurring opinion in Ewing v. California, where he argued that 
only retribution, the principle that punishment is deserved for moral wrongdoing, could animate a 
meaningful proportionality principle. 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
For Justice Scalia, the Constitution contained no such commitment to a single penal purpose and thus 
found no proportionality principle at all. Id. at 31–32. 
39 On Bentham, see LIEBERMAN, supra note 27. On Cesare Beccaria, whose 1764 book On Crimes 
and Punishments may have been the most influential book every written on criminal law, see JOHN D. 
BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2014). 
40 In our legal theory, the law breaking citizen and the abnormal subject of surveillance and 
segregation should be hermetically sealed off. The state can segregate dangerous subjects or punish 
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carceral principles is nothing less than the death of the proportionality 
(perhaps the central Enlightenment virtue for penal law). Citing the 
importance of deferring to state choices among penal policies, and the 
rationality of extremely long prison sentences for minor crimes if based on 
the need to incapacitate the prisoner against future crimes, the Supreme 
Court upheld a twenty-five-year to life sentence for a property theft.41  
On the police side, the legal state has insisted since 1961 on assessing 
the reasonableness of many police activities through the application of the 
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.42 This landmark ruling and 
the early efforts of the Warren Court to enforce it, marked a belated 
acknowledgment that the police side of the carceral state operated 
unregulated by and even in tension with the values of the legal state. As 
developed in the intervening decades, however, the jurisprudence of the 
Fourth Amendment has been one of exception after exception to the legal 
requirements of reasonableness in the name of the exigencies, special 
needs, or special expertise of the police.43 Thus while the Eighth and Fourth 
Amendments purport to subordinate the carceral state in its prison and 
police modes to the legal state, the failure of the courts or legislatures to 
recognize the distinctive logic of the carceral state, or even worse to 
recognize it and defer to it, have made them hollow promises for the most 
part. 
This uneasy marriage of legality and abnormality which characterized 
the emergence of modern criminal justice institutions in both Europe and 
the United States in the nineteenth century had a distinct political–
economic context: the project of disciplining once semiautonomous rural 
laborers and adventurers into labor power that could be consumed, with 
surplus value extracted.44 The enlarged carceral state that formed under the 
surface of the legal state and its sovereignty came to exert most of its 
lawbreakers under two different sets of rules. But given the plasticity of the criminal law and the 
discretionary power of the carceral state, the two have always blended extensively. The four purposes of 
punishment are one of the few places our texts even obliquely reference this. 
41 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30–31 (plurality opinion) (upholding a twenty-five-year to life sentence under 
California’s three strikes law as not grossly disproportionate given California’s choice of incapacitation 
as its primary penal rationale). 
42 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule, as well as the 
Fourth Amendment itself, are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
43 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (upholding warrantless entry to home to 
prevent the destruction of evidence even though provoked by police activity); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30–31 (1968) (upholding a stop on less than probable cause based on police expertise and reasonable 
suspicions that a crime was occurring). 
44 FOUCAULT, supra note 11; MARX, supra note 33, ch. 6. 
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immense power over the bodies of working class communities.45 In short, 
the scale of the carceral state was determined not by legal but by economic 
and social factors created by the emergence of capitalism. 
For most of the nineteenth century, this dual structure allowed courts 
and lawmaking institutions to maintain superficial equality in their mandate 
while class based inequality received critical ideological and coercive 
support from the actual application of law mediated by police and penal 
establishments. But as working class citizens won the right to vote and 
created powerful labor parties in Europe and formed powerful urban 
political “machines” in the United States,46 the influence of the legal state 
with the carceral state began to moderate the severity of the latter’s 
application to the general body of the working class.47 After the catastrophe 
of World War II, the growth of national legal rights and then transnational 
human rights through the United Nations and (in the case of Europe) the 
Council of Europe has reshaped the carceral state into a subordinate unit of 
the welfare state. This produced a distinctive European penality that 
emphasizes human dignity and reintegration.48 Although the practice of the 
carceral state may often fall short of those goals, the embeddedness of legal 
norms there provides restraint largely absent in the United States. 
In the American context, the first phase of this evolution proceeded 
quite similarly, perhaps even accelerated by the political revolution of 
1776, which removed the monarchy, installed something close to universal 
white male suffrage, and generated widespread elite concerns about 
breakdowns in civil and familial hierarchies.49 Yet, from the beginning of 
the Republic, the organization of legal authority—prosecutors and police—
at the local level, has been an outgrowth of the need for a race-based 
system of social control that could turn the general laws of the state into the 
precise instruments of a defense of whiteness, whether against black, 
Mexican, Chinese, or Native American peoples as needed by location.50  
45 Dario Melossi, Introduction: The Simple “Heuristic Maxim” of an “Unusual Human Being,” in 
GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE xii (rev. ed. 2003). 
46 WILLIAM STUNTZ, COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (discussing role of urban 
political machines in moderating punitiveness of the carceral state in the early 20th century). 
47 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES (1985). 
48 WHITMAN, supra note 1; see DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & SONJA SNACKEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN PRISON LAW AND POLICY: PENOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009). 
49 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC (rev. ed. 1990). 
50 STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2010) (describing how local institutions allowed racial precision in penal 
control). 
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It is the maintenance and reinscription of that carceral state by race in 
the period after Reconstruction that perhaps more than the early Republic 
(including slavery itself) has determined the fate of the United States to be 
an exceptional carceral state. After the nation’s brief flirtation with national 
intervention in local criminal justice for the purpose of de-racing it during 
Reconstruction,51 the growth of the carceral state would continue and 
indeed accelerate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
fanned by fears of immigrants in the North, “free” black citizens in the 
South, and theoretically equal fellow citizens in the conquered Mexican 
territories.52 Along the color lines of these already traditional low-level 
“civil wars” fought out at the local level in American society both before 
and after the great Civil War that created our version of national 
citizenship, the emergence of eugenics and state racism remade the carceral 
state at the turn of the twentieth century.53 
II. THE AGE OF EUGENICS
In retrospect, we can see that the relationship between the legal state 
and the carceral state in the United States, relative to Europe, was always 
distinguished around the problems of race and colonial domination, with a 
smaller, more locally-dominated legal state and a larger and less legally-
bound carceral state taking shape in the United States.54 The needs of 
slavery and sustaining the dispossession of indigenous communities by 
colonial expansion westward have no doubt left their mark on our 
contemporary carceral state, but their legacy was significantly altered in 
ways that have made them even more intractable by the great reframing of 
the carceral state that took place in both the United States and Europe at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries and was 
associated with the rise of positivist criminology and scientific racism.55 
51 U.S. Army courts for example allowed black citizens to testify, something forbidden in state 
courts. FONER, supra note 10, at 8. 
52 STUNTZ, supra note 46 (linking the growth of the criminal justice system in American history 
with racial and nativist fears). 
53 MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE,
1975–1976 (Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana & Arnold I. Davidson eds., David Macey trans., 2003). 
In the United States this also corresponds to the emergence of immigration exclusions based on 
nationality.  
54 WHITMAN, supra note 1. 
55 For general accounts of this turning point in the history of criminal justice, see DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE 
AMERICA (1980) (describing the American case), and GARLAND, supra note 47. More recently, Khalil 
Gibran Muhammad has highlighted how much this targeted black criminality. See KHALIL GIBRAN 
MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
URBAN AMERICA (2010). 
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In important respects, the story of divergence accelerated at the turn of 
the twentieth century as the problem of governing societies in both Europe 
and the United States came to be defined in biological and evolutionary 
terms. The age of eugenics posited that variation among the major racial 
groups of humans explained the global success of Europe as the dominant 
colonizer, and the relative success of European-originating Americans 
(particularly western and northern European) in the United States and other 
settler colonial societies.56 Eugenicists believed that practices of managing 
the racial makeup of the nation—both micro-interventions aimed at 
particular individuals and macro ones aimed at population flows—could be 
used to optimize the racial (and thus social and economic) health of the 
nation.57 The most potent form of scientific racism in its influence on the 
carceral state was Cesare Lombroso’s positive criminal anthropology, 
which posited that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks, whose deviant 
behavior was a natural expression of their more primitive constitution.58 
Lombroso and his acolytes across in Europe and the United States called 
for an end to retributive and deterrence-based punishment while advocating 
the acceptance of medicalized supervision and isolation of criminally 
abnormal individuals in the name of incapacitation (and perhaps 
rehabilitation where possible). 
In Europe, jurists stiffly resisted the penetration of the legal and 
carceral states by eugenic thinking, because they saw scientific racism as a 
decisive challenge to legality (and thus their own authority).59 But in the 
United States, with race already central to all aspects of government, the 
already strong grip of the carceral state on the legal state, and the unique 
role of the U.S. prosecutor as a translator between the two, eugenic ideas 
were embraced with enthusiasm and became central to the “reforms” we 
still call “progressive.”60 The fairly broad carceral oversight and control of 
56 WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 50–52 (discussing American immigration laws based on racial 
preferences and as models for Nazi planners); Ann L. Stoler, Making Empire Respectable: The Politics 
of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th‐Century Colonial Cultures, 16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 634 (1989) 
(describing the centrality of eugenics to colonialist notions of European supremacy). 
57 ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS (1992); CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH 
OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 
(1991); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (rev. ed. 1996); NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA 
OF RACE IN SCIENCE (1982); Mae Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A 
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST. 67 (1999). 
58 DAVID G. HORN, THE CRIMINAL BODY: LOMBROSO AND THE ANATOMY OF DEVIANCE (2003). 
59 Id. 
60 For a more in-depth analysis, see Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the Inventor of 
Scientific Criminology Who Died at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Continues to Haunt 
American Crime Control at the Beginning of the Twenty-First, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2135 (2006). On the 
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the urban working classes developed in the nineteenth century came to be 
decisively fractured on lines of race at the turn of the twentieth. Immigrants 
of European origin were placed in a frame of possible improvement and 
socialization. However, blacks—escaping the deep South to northern and 
midwestern cities in large numbers in the early stages of the Great 
Migration—were framed as largely unassimilable and fit targets for 
punitive segregation and exclusion.61 From this period on, America’s 
carceral state enforced a color line not through a distribution to different 
institutions (slavery versus penitentiary) but through the construction of the 
black citizen (male or female, usually young but older as well) as the 
“symbolic assailant.”62 The black citizen was defined as the dangerous or 
hardened end of any continuum of abnormal citizens subject to the carceral 
state. Of course that has never meant an immunity for whites who, through 
their own deviance, queerness, or class othering, have always formed a 
large portion of the subjects of the carceral state.63 It does, however, mean 
that every parameter along which we can measure disparity in carceral state 
contact and treatment—from arrest, through juvenile court waiver, through 
the death penalty—is distributed by race with blacks forming the more 
punished and whites the least.64 
The strong embrace of eugenics and state racism at the turn of the 
twentieth century led to the creation of a larger and more divergent 
continuum of carceral institutions in the United States to contain the 
defective and rehabilitate the redeemable. Only the fascist European states 
of the mid-twentieth century would come anywhere close to the level of 
U.S. enthusiasm for the use of carceral institutions to “govern” the 
relationship of eugenic thinking to the Progressive Era reforms like juvenile courts, probation, and 
parole, see ROTHMAN, supra note 55, at 58. 
61 Opposition to Southern and Eastern European immigrants was strong enough by the 1920s to end 
legal immigration. Those immigrants already here were viewed as dangerous, but potentially 
assimilable. In contrast, black migrants from the South were characterized as a threat to urban security 
that was far less amenable to socializing strategies, and to which the most punitive forms of segregation 
and exclusion were appropriate. See generally MUHAMMAD, supra note 55. 
62 The term was originally coined in the 1960s by sociologist Jerome Skolnick. See JEROME H.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 44–45 (3d ed. 1994); see also Jeannine Bell, The Symbolic 
Assailant Revisited (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 371, Apr. 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2955845 [https://perma.cc/6JS9-LEPV].  
63 For example, white prisoners made up 34% of prisoners in 2015. See CARSON & ANDERSON, 
supra note 30, at 6 tbl.3. 
64 Thus, while white prisoners made up 34% of prisoners, only 312 whites were imprisoned per 
100,000 free citizens over 18, while 1,745 blacks were imprisoned and 820 Hispanics per 100,000 in 
the over-18 population. Id. at 8 tbl.5. 
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population in racial terms—including sterilization of asylum and prison 
inmates, life sentences for recidivists, and in the racial focus of policing.65 
III. WAR ON CRIME
In Europe, beginning in the 1960s, states abolished the death penalty 
and, to varying degrees, accepted a human rights framework in which their 
historically lower levels of incarceration and more rehabilitative penal 
ideology has moved, to some degree, above politics.66 In the United States, 
beginning at the same time, states reaffirmed their support for the death 
penalty and began to implement harsher sentencing laws and a penal 
ideology of harsh punishment and exclusionary segregation.67  
Historians will continue to debate the relative balance of factors that 
drove policymakers at the federal and state level to expand the carceral 
state many times during the last three decades of the twentieth century.68 
The politics included a toxic mix of popular anxiety over street crime in the 
cities,69 elite anxiety over urban insurgencies like the Watts Riots of 1965 
and prison riots,70 and growing mismatches between urban poverty 
populations and low skill labor opportunities.71 Historians have been rightly 
troubled by the proximity between the rise of civil rights laws and values 
and expansion of the carceral states, as if the latter were a response to the 
former.72  
But the motivations of policymakers and voters may be less important 
than the fact that the visible changes in the legal state undertaken during the 
Civil Rights Era, and the war on crime that followed, had little bearing on 
the largely invisible carceral state which continued undeflected with the 
mission begun in the eugenic era. While the legal state may have 
undertaken to reduce visible discrimination on the basis of race and to 
sanction serious crime instead of race and poverty, the carceral state, now 
much expanded, continued its historic concentration on the black 
65 Not to mention cross-racial marriage which was criminalized in thirty states in this period, many 
of them outside the South. WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 12. 
66 VAN ZYL SMIT & SNACKEN, supra note 48. 
67 GARLAND, supra note 25; WHITMAN, supra note 1; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991). 
68 For the most current assessment, see generally ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON 
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016). 
69 TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER 
(2001). 
70 HEATHER ANN THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 1971 AND 
ITS LEGACY (2016). 
71 WESTERN, supra note 4. 
72 HINTON, supra note 68. 
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communities that formed the core of abnormality (at least as frontline 
carceral workers and their managers had long learned to understand it).73 
From this perspective, changes in the administration of the penal system 
during the twentieth century followed from the strategic decision to expand 
the reach of the carceral state, not a change in its underlying philosophy. 
For instance, the partial abandonment of parole and rehabilitation in prison 
was consistent with the expanded carceral control over poor people of color 
whose raced and irremediable abnormality had long been normalized in the 
basic perceptions and procedures of the police and prisons.  
Since the American and European carceral states diverged, a more 
fruitful comparison can now be found between the American carceral state 
and the rest of the administrative and, even more so, the legal state. Seen 
this way, a different historical trajectory comes into view. We can more 
easily see the traces left on the carceral state by the century-long 
interrupted struggle to “reconstruct” American law and society to undo the 
status of slavery and its afterlives. For example, it was not until the 1970s 
and 1980s that federal courts finally ended practices of plantation-like labor 
organized along racial lines in southern prison systems that reflected norms 
and practices consistent with those during the height of Jim Crow in the 
early decades of the twentieth century.74  
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s not only 
accelerated pressure for racial equality in the administrative and legal 
states, but also shed visibility on the carceral state’s role in maintaining the 
racialized hierarchy of the status quo. The great civil rights victories of the 
mid-1960s were achieved in the legal state through statutes promising to 
end discrimination in jobs and housing.75 Implementing these legislative 
achievements, especially in areas like housing, would have taken an 
aggressive expansion of administrative agencies aimed at enforcing them 
that never came. In the carceral state however, no major federal or state 
civil rights initiatives were forthcoming.76 Indeed, no other segment of 
American government was as aggressively opposed to civil rights 
objectives as those institutions making up the carceral state. This was 
perhaps most visible in police departments, which viewed themselves as 
the frontline against the desegregation of jobs, schools, and housing 
73 Id. 
74 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998). 
75 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (2014); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)). 
76 FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 51 (arguing that legislatures will not legislate rules for policing). 
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demanded by civil rights protesters in this period.77 The prison side of the 
carceral state was perhaps even more bitterly opposed to civil rights claims, 
especially as they arose in the context of challenges to the authority of 
guards and culminated in spectacular failures for the carceral state like the 
Attica prison uprising.78  
The national commitment to protecting equality through law in areas 
like employment and housing at least achieved landmark legislation.79 
When it came to addressing racism in the carceral state, however, no 
substantial legislation ever emerged and it took until the 1990s for concerns 
about police racism to make it into national crime legislation.80 Instead, it 
fell to the Supreme Court to produce a body of civil rights law in the form 
of constitutional criminal procedure rules governing when police could 
stop, search, and arrest citizens. This body of law, however, focused on the 
reasonableness of police searches and seizures, leaving mention of race or 
equality to footnotes.81 Among its many flaws as a method for countering 
the normalization of race in the carceral state, constitutional criminal 
procedure was premised primarily on the power of the legal state to 
incentivize reform in the carceral state. In particular, the penalty of 
excluding evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
presumes the carceral state either cares about individual legal outcomes in 
the courts or can be made to do so by prosecutorial influence.82 Everything 
we have discussed about the power of the carceral state—its focus on 
racialized notions of abnormality, and the role of prosecutors as translators 
between the legal state and the carceral state—suggests why this is 
unlikely. The focus of the carceral state is on abnormality not crime; it 
exercises permanent surveillance and control, not a single game of guilt or 
innocence. And prosecutors depend on the cooperation of police far more 
than the other way around. 
Whatever chance criminal procedure as a system of judicial discipline 
over the police through the exclusionary rule might have had was soon 
77 Jonathan Simon, Policing After Civil Rights, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POLICING 
373 (Ben Bradford, Beatrice Jauregui, Ian Loader & Jonny Steinberg eds., 2016). 
78 THOMPSON, supra note 70; see also Dan Berger, Mass Incarceration and Its Mystification: A 
Review of the 13th, AFR. AM. INTELL. HIST. SOC’Y BLOG (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.aaihs.org/mass-
incarceration-and-its-mystification-a-review-of-the-13th/ [https://perma.cc/Y4V5-EC99].  
79 See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Fair Housing Act. 
80 Federal funding flowed to police departments after 1968, but none of it was conditioned on 
improvements in police respect for the civil rights of minority citizens. See HINTON, supra note 68. 
81 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968).  
82 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the primary purpose for the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy in Fourth Amendment violations is deterring police officers by denying the evidence use in 
prosecuting the defendant whose rights were violated. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016). 
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engulfed as the legislative and executive sides of the legal state entered into 
a war on crime in which urban police were to be the frontline soldiers.83 
The very kinds of aggressive confrontational policing that police were 
beginning to use against black citizens were embraced as best practices to 
be nationalized in the war on crime.84 By the time the prison population 
began to rise noticeably in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the carceral state 
had been greatly enlarged while leaving its racialized conception of 
abnormality in place and normalizing its racist practices as crime control. 
Critically, the eugenic weaponizing of the carceral state against 
racially abnormal subjects (and particularly black citizens) was never 
repudiated. The expansive carceral state attuned to its goals remained 
largely intact as the war on crime took off as a political agenda in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The place of biological theories of racial degeneracy or 
inferiority was quickly replaced by new sociological theories that provided 
historical and cultural explanations for the same patterns of inequality.85 
Theoretically, these ideas were more amenable to reform policies aimed at 
undoing the damage of history on culture. But as applied to black citizens 
living in concentrated districts of economic disadvantage in the post-World 
War II urban landscape, they lent support to an aggressive war on crime. 
Even the language of the most influential sociological account of “ghetto” 
life in the 1960s, Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s “tangle of pathologies,” 
invoked heightened concerns about risk and abnormality associated 
historically with biological racism.86 
This created a significant lag in the status of race equality between the 
legal state and the carceral state. Although the workforce within the 
carceral state underwent substantial change between the 1960s and the 
present, becoming far more diverse, better educated, and less likely to 
harbor racist, sexist, or homophobic values,87 their mission, a ramped-up 
war on “abnormality,” remained inextricably bound to race (not alone, but 
with other factors like neighborhood, gender, and age). However, because 
the carceral state was now wrapped in a “war on crime” presumption of 
valor, high levels of confidence in the police and support for harsher prison 
sentences and the death penalty remained fixtures of American public 
opinion in the last decades of the twentieth century.  
83 HINTON, supra note 68; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 60 (2007). 
84 HINTON, supra note 68. 
85 Id.  
86 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, The Tangle of Pathology, in THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR 
NATIONAL ACTION 29 (1965). 
87 DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008). 
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At moments, like the 1991 beating of a black motorist in Los Angeles 
captured on video, temporary gaps in this support opened.88 But, overall, 
the lack of visibility of the carceral state and the normalization of a race-
based war on crime rooted in the racialization of abnormality made any 
racial justice critique of the carceral state extremely limited in its impact. In 
the Supreme Court’s major encounter with the question of racial 
discrimination in extreme punishment during the era of mass incarceration, 
McCleskey v. Kemp,89 a closely divided Court dismissed impressive 
statistical evidence that racial factors (especially the whiteness of the 
victim, but also the bias against black defendants, especially when they 
killed a white victim) were driving death penalty selection. In the majority 
view, only direct evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of the legal 
state or the carceral state, particularly prosecutors, juries, or courts, could 
constitute a violation of equal protection.90 Any step toward recognizing 
disparate patterns of treatment as a constitutional problem would, 
according to this view, compromise the essential discretion of local actors 
in the carceral and legal states; discretion is necessary to allow 
abnormality, rather than crime, to be the subject of the punitive power. Not 
even civil rights organizations, let alone their allies in labor unions and 
mainstream liberal organizations, attempted to challenge prisons or police 
on mass incarceration and aggressive policing until quite recently. That 
burden fell to remnants of the social justice movements of the 1960s, many 
of whom helped to found Critical Resistance in Berkeley in 1999, including 
Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, and many other long-term social 
justice activists.91  
IV. THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED: THE CARCERAL STATE
FLUNKS THE TEST OF COLOR-BLIND EQUALITY 
In the decades since the great legislative victories of the Civil Rights 
Movement, the values of equality and freedom from racial discrimination 
have undergone two very significant developments. First, they have 
become national values, reflected in what has been called our civil religion 
88 Ironically, the Los Angeles riots that took place following the acquittal of the police officers 
helped reinforce the war on crime’s logic, and confidence in police quickly recovered. See JORDAN 
CAMP, INCARCERATING THE CRISIS: FREEDOM STRUGGLES AND THE RISE OF THE NEOLIBERAL STATE 
115 (2016). 
89 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
90 Id. at 297–98. 
91 I have heard both Davis and Gilmore comment on their personal surprise at the level of response, 
especially from young activists; an early sign that the values clash between the carceral state and the 
equality principle of the legal state was becoming apparent for younger adults, an effect we will return 
to. 
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of constitutional faith, and marked by the national holiday observing the 
birthday of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Polling data shows that 
racism is now among the most discrediting attributes that can be associated 
with people and, thus, has become a charge vigorously contested by most 
people to whom it is applied.92  
Second, the meaning of racial equality, and antidiscrimination values 
in particular, reflected in legal precedent, have been narrowed to a rejection 
of decisionmaking based on racial animus against others, and a 
commitment to the social ideal sometimes described as “color blindness.”93 
Many legal scholars have persuasively argued that this narrow color-blind 
conception of equality renders the promise of equal protection and the 
protection of civil rights empty to the victims of historical discrimination 
who are consistently undermined by the hardening of generations of 
discriminatory conduct into structural advantages and disadvantages.94 For 
example, discriminatory government preferences for whites to obtain low-
cost federally guaranteed mortgages starting in the 1930s has added to the 
wealth gap between whites and blacks, even as official discrimination has 
been reduced.95 But if this wealth gap, or harmful contemporary choices 
forced by it (like blacks being more vulnerable to the subprime market for 
mortgages) were brought to court under the “color-blind” jurisprudence 
favored by a majority on the Supreme Court, the claims would lose for lack 
of evidence of intentional discrimination.  
Until the explosion of the Black Lives Matter movement, it seemed 
that the success of color-blind jurisprudence in the Supreme Court96 and in 
92 See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE
REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014). 
93 Color blindness as a metaphor for what government respect for the equal protection of citizens 
means is often traced to Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: “Our constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law.” 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J, dissenting). Since the 1980s, the 
metaphor has been deployed mostly by conservatives in the name of limiting governmental efforts at 
redistribution aimed at ameliorating the history of official racism. See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial 
Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 
1061–62 (2010) (explaining color blindness as an ideology); see also OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED 
BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND (2014) (discussing this critique and a 
fascinating empirical examination of the limits of the color-blind metaphor). 
94 HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 92; OBASOGIE, supra note 93. 
95 Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 
75 AM. SOC. REV. 629 (2010); James Surowiecki, The Widening Racial Wealth Divide, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/the-widening-racial-wealth-divide 
[https://perma.cc/88Z4-UJGQ] (describing history of federal discrimination and its contemporary 
consequences). 
96 For the Supreme Court’s embrace of color blindness, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down school integration programs that did not 
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popular legal culture had largely neutralized the rise of civil rights to the 
pantheon of national values as an actual tool for reform.97 Yet over the past 
ten years, the carceral state’s increasingly visible racial disparities—in 
particular its most punitive and aggressive actions—seems to have crossed 
a threshold of public recognition that have broken through what Haney 
López helpfully describes as a “shield” that has immunized racially 
impactful criminal justice programs from criticism.98 In the recent past, 
claims of discrimination in the criminal justice system made to the courts 
were generally dismissed on the grounds that racially correlated statistical 
patterns did not prove discriminatory intent and were likely explainable by 
legitimate factors unaccounted for in the data.99 While that shield may still 
work in court, it appears to be breaking down rapidly in popular legal 
consciousness. In particular, the Black Lives Matter movement has now 
evolved into a full-fledged multiracial social movement buttressed by a 
growing bipartisan national consensus that the carceral state in its present 
form is racially discriminatory. Color-blind jurisprudence may remain a 
powerful cloaking device for the racial hierarchy maintained in the private 
sector and in the benefit aspects of the legal and administrative states. But 
it seems to be losing its power for the carceral state. Indeed, given the 
history recounted here in which the carceral state has been organized 
around policing and punishing abnormality (rather than law breaking), and 
in which abnormality has been blackened or raced, how could the actions 
of the carceral state be anything like color-blind. After all, drug policing 
has been widely recognized in recent years to be focused on communities 
and young people of color; a practice which the Supreme Court implicitly 
accepted in the 1990s when it refused to find pretextual automobile stops 
unconstitutional.100 
remediate past intentional racial discrimination); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995) (holding that all government racial classifications, including affirmative programs, are subject to 
strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment); and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989) (striking down affirmative action programs for minorities in the form of government set-
asides). Popular uptake of color blindness has also manifested in opposition to affirmative action 
programs in employment, government benefits, and education. 
97 Haney López, supra note 93, at 1062 (noting that color blindness can be critiqued as a sword 
against programs helpful to minorities but also as a shield against the recognition of discrimination in a 
criminal justice context). 
98 Id. 
99 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a Georgia 
death sentence based on statistical showing that a person in the defendant’s position as a black person 
convicted of killing a white victim was more likely to receive a capital sentence). 
100 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that probable cause of a traffic violation 
renders the resulting stop reasonable regardless of the police's actual reasons for the stop). That Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor recently called out the racial logic of this and other recent decisions in her dissent in 
Utah v. Strieff is another sign that the lack of color blindness now demands recognition. 136 S. Ct. 
111:1625 (2017) Racing Abnormality 
1647 
Of course this does not mean that we should now embrace color-blind 
jurisprudence as the proper way to understand the constitutional promise of 
equality under the law. We can and should argue for a more structurally 
cognizant approach to equality enforcement that looks beyond one-off 
decisions to patterns and practices, as well as to the institutionalized 
legacies of historic discrimination as they operate in the present distribution 
of risks and opportunities. Yet it is important that we do not miss the 
opportunity to hold the carceral state fully accountable for its visible 
dependence on race. The contemporary carceral state relies on racial coding 
for almost everything it does, from arrest through prison. While I will 
highlight some possible action paths to make this accountability 
meaningful in my Conclusion, this is a conversation that should be led by 
impacted communities above all. This is an important opportunity to 
demand an end to what amounted to a system of targeted racial recruitment 
for arrest, prosecution, and punishment (just the kind of preferential 
treatment condemned in the affirmative action cases celebrating our color- 
blind Constitution) and demand a carceral state that actually protects 
minority lives. It is telling in this regard that the Black Lives Matter 
movement is the first civil rights movement in U.S. history that has put the 
carceral state at the very center of its critique of American racism and its 
demands for change.101 
V. REFORMING THE CARCERAL STATES AS IF BLACK LIVES MATTER
Of all the forces that anchor hyperpunitive policies in the U.S. carceral
state, none has seemed more intractable and resistant to change than race, 
or rather the history of white supremacy and racial othering that we 
sometimes call race for short hand.102 Today however, it may be the most 
plastic, the most capable of transmitting forces of deep change into the 
heart of the carceral state. I fear that I will inevitably be labelled wildly 
overoptimistic, but not as much as I fear giving into a battle-hardened 
pessimism that sees the present institutional order as impossible to change. 
Two of the features of our present common sense about mass incarceration 
2056, 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate 
victims of this type of scrutiny.”). 
101 Platform, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ 
[https://perma.cc/WX9R-NUEQ]. The Black Panther Party, founded in Oakland in the 1960s, targeted 
much of its early criticism on police and prisons but moved quickly to establish itself as liberation 
movement. See JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE HISTORY 
AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2013). 
102 It is not that white supremacy has been unchangeable, but that it has reestablished itself through 
new mechanisms despite significant efforts at legal reform. ALEXANDER, supra note 4; Loïc Wacquant, 
Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 95 (2001).  
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and race are telling in this respect. First, it is because the carceral state has 
for so long lagged the legal state on race that today it faces such a 
significant legitimacy deficit. The long war on crime provided a shelter for 
racial discrimination that is no longer available. Second, the very 
enlargement of the carceral state driven by that war on crime has made it 
exceptionally important to the reproduction of racialized exclusion and 
inequality in the present era. That fact makes concerted civil rights 
movements focused on the legitimacy of the carceral state—like Black 
Lives Matter—at once necessary, transformative, and promising.  
Most importantly, that movement finds a carceral state that is running 
a legitimacy deficit, particularly on race. The British political theorist 
David Beetham has provided a helpful way to split the difference between 
a purely empirical approach to legitimacy (which can diagnose a crisis only 
after open acts of disobedience and refusal to consent to the law), and 
purely normative approach (in which only a moral philosopher can tell 
whether an institution is legitimate or not, and no one else cares).103 For 
Beetham, people do (and sometimes do not) hold particular institutions (or 
a whole state) as being legitimate and thus ruling as a matter of right, and 
they have reasons for doing so. Those reasons, grounded in history and 
circumstance rather than philosophical first principles, are where the 
empirical and the philosophical meet. Through survey, ethnographic, 
historical, and other kinds of qualitative and quantitative research we can 
try to understand the substantive normative values that support 
legitimacy.104 Through critical philosophical and interpretive analysis of 
those values we can begin to identify potential gaps, or in Beetham’s 
phrase, “legitimacy deficits,” which while invisible to the empiricist, may 
be like the termite-ridden floor, ready to give way at the first serious 
pressure. The critical-philosophical and the empirical ideally need to come 
together to discern what these values mean to people in the world as they 
live it. 
Those looking for the results of that idealized study can stop reading 
now as I have not done it. Instead let me restate my contention above that 
the contemporary carceral state now very likely stands on top of just such a 
legitimacy deficit with respect to the value of equality in the narrowed form 
103 DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1st ed. 1991). For a collection of writings 
applying Beetham’s ideas to criminal justice reform, see LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Justice 
Tankebe & Alison Liebling eds., 2013). 
104 Something, notice, that the more popular procedural justice approach to legitimacy tends to 
acknowledge but ignores as harder to change or reach than procedurally-based perceptions of 
legitimacy. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
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reflected in “color-blind jurisprudence.”105 While those to the left of me will 
immediately declaim that benefit can come from color-blind jurisprudence, 
the carceral state may be the exception that proves their rule. Precisely 
because it cannot actually stop taking race into account—without 
abandoning its century-long mission of governing abnormality—the 
carceral state faces an existential crisis. Indeed, when pressed to the wall on 
race, as in the New York City “stop and frisk” case,106 the carceral state 
must itself begin to construct structural arguments about race and 
inequality. 
Elsewhere I have developed the argument for why mid-course 
corrections—like more “evidence based policies”—may not suffice to 
resolve this crisis.107 Here I want to close by addressing what we should 
want from this moment, if it is indeed correct that transformative steps can 
now be justified to bring the carceral state into better alignment with the 
color-blind equality values of the legal state, if not an even deeper 
commitment to equality. Reforms aimed at addressing unconscious bias 
among the actors of the carceral state, while worthy, will not be enough, 
compared to the massive and quite conscious racialized surface of 
abnormality on which the carceral state routinely requires them to act. 
Measures aimed at improving “trust”108 between communities of color and 
frontline workers of the carceral state will not work even in their own terms 
without being attached to concerted efforts to recognize and reverse the 
historic racing of abnormality (including the resultant normalization of race 
for the frontline workers of the carceral state).109 
105 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017) (showing through the use of 
hypothetical cases how Fourth Amendment precedent authorizes police racial profiling of the sort that 
clearly violates color-blind equality principles). 
106 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
107 Jonathan Simon, Is the U.S. Carceral State Facing a Crisis of Legitimacy? (Jan. 17, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that a changing social experience of crime as 
well as the solidification of equality and dignity as national values have created legitimacy deficit for 
the greatly expanded version of the carceral state that took shape during the war on crime from the 
1970s through the 1990s).  
108 PRESIDENT’S TASKFORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT IV (2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB9U-NP37] (defining 
a major goal of the taskforce as increasing trust). 
109 An important step in this direction occurred late last year when the head of the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, the largest organization of police departments in the United States, 
explicitly apologized on behalf of all police for “historical mistreatment of communities of color.” 
Merrit Kennedy, Head of Police Chiefs Group Apologies for ‘Historical Mistreatment’ of Minorities, 
NPR (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/18/498380373/ 
head-of-police-chiefs-group-apologizes-for-historical-mistreatment-of-minorities [https://perma.cc/ 
QJ4G-PK7Y].  
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Perhaps peculiar twinning of the legal and the carceral state in the 
modern system of criminal law enforcement through incarceration and 
policing cannot be undone.110 Efforts to purify the legal nature of the penal 
sanction, such as the determinate sentencing movement of the 1970s and 
1980s, turned out to simply deepen the hold of racial norms on the carceral 
state.111 Instead, it is race-based abnormality itself that must be expunged at 
the capillary level where the power to punish is applied to specific bodies. 
Only a sustained and democratic process can achieve such an 
expungement. 
Reconstructing the carceral state will require a democratic process that 
involves impacted communities first and foremost in re-norming the 
abnormality against which the carceral state operates. It is not for a law 
professor in a university chair to determine what this would look like or 
take. I may know more about the history of the carceral state than many of 
the people who come into daily contact with it, but far less about what 
kinds of transformations would be necessary to build or even imagine a 
carceral state that is viewed as legitimate by the citizens who do. What 
history can tell us is that powerful investments of knowledge and power in 
the racial nature of abnormality will not be easy to reform or remove. Like 
a cancer they operate at the “DNA” level of our carceral institutions.  
A first practical step necessary to lay the ground work for any serious 
democratic discourse over how to reshape the carceral state is to suspend 
those activities of the carceral state most saturated with racialized 
abnormality: extreme punishments, aggressive policing, and revolving door 
probation sanctions. All of those operations of the carceral state that 
depend most on discretionary judgments of abnormality are the ones most 
deeply infected by the malignancy of race, and they must be curtailed to 
close the zero point.  
This will raise great howls of alarm. Since the late 1960s, a whole 
apparatus of hybrid federal and state/local police units, proactive policing 
models, and special courts have grown up both to target punishment and to 
capture some of the few social service dollars available for zones of 
segregated urban poverty which have been the main theaters of the war.112 
110 FOUCAULT, supra note 8. 
111 Many hoped that taking away judicial discretion in sentencing would reduce discrimination on 
the basis of race, but that ignored the power of police and prosecutors to selectively target on race. See 
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN 
AMERICA 39 (2006) (discussing criticism on left and right of judicial discretion in sentencing). 
112 MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS 
PUNISHMENT (2009) (showing that proactive police and probation practices are more effective than 
severe punishment); MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN 
FEDERAL COURT 49 (2016) (noting that federal–state coordination in drug prosecutions in some courts 
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Rather than replacing the structures of racialized abnormality, this war on 
crime system has absorbed it and extended it. Any attempt to roll these 
back in the name of restoring a democratic discourse on the proper role of 
the carceral state will face the charge that such a unilateral withdrawal will 
lead to a catastrophic return to the era of high crime. Part of a response is to 
insist that actual record of success for such practices, however, outside of a 
very small number of examples that are rarely replicated empirically but 
frequently cited in policy terms, is quite unremarkable.113  
Second, the frontline actors who bear the most responsibility for how 
the carceral state impacts communities of color—prosecutors, police, 
probation officers—must adopt practices calculated to make them as 
responsive as possible to actual community norms. For federal prosecutors, 
this means withdrawing support from the use of powerful federal 
sentencing measures against defendants defined as especially dangerous 
and abnormal by local police and prosecutors.114 For policing, this means a 
return to responding to 911 calls initiated by citizens.115 Visiting citizens 
who actually want police help, and delivering service, would go a long way 
to address mistrust and might even provide the police knowledge about 
more serious crimes currently blocked by no-snitching norms. If more 
proactive means are used, they should always be filtered through 
randomizing mechanisms designed to break the normalization of race for 
the carceral state.116 
Probation, second only to police in its scale within the carceral state, 
poses a deeper problem.117 Perhaps no part of the carceral state is as 
historically associated with the supervision of abnormality than probation. 
Introduced at the height of the eugenic era, probation provides a finer-
grained surveillance and supervision of abnormal elements in the 
community (mostly defined by immigration status and race). The harder 
edge of this flexible institution has always been aimed at youth of color and 
forms an important part of a “youth control complex” that shadows and 
is justified as protective of the black community and even the mostly black defendants); REBECCA 
TIGER, JUDGING ADDICTS: DRUG COURTS AND COERCION IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2013) (highlighting 
the coercive quality of the rehabilitation offered by drug courts). 
113 HINTON, supra note 68. 
114 LYNCH, supra note 112. 
115 See Bell, supra note 62, at 56 (arguing for a responsive police model). 
116 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE (2007). 
117 See HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., PROGRAM IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & MGMT., TOWARD AN 
APPROACH TO COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSENSUS DOCUMENT OF THE 
EXECUTIVE SESSION ON COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS (2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/
files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/Consensus_Final2.pdf  [https://perma.cc/9AG3-K8LT].  
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deforms the lives of these young people.118 At the same time probation is 
more associated with rehabilitation and reentry services delivery than any 
other part of the carceral state. At a time of crisis for mass incarceration, 
probation with its premise of supervised release in the community, and its 
offer of aid, is an overwhelmingly attractive compromise. Yet the power to 
sanction people on probation for violating administrative conditions has 
made it a formidable engine of incarceration.119 
Across all of this, there must extend an effort from within the carceral 
state to externalize and document the knowledge of its own practices of 
race norming.120 Here professors can be helpers, democratic “under-
laborers” as Ian Loader and Richard Sparks would put it.121 Along with 
journalists, they should be immediately brought into the archives of the 
carceral state to help produce this history. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States in many ways is not exceptional. Like the European 
states of which we were a colonial outgrowth, we forged a new kind of 
criminal justice system in the nineteenth century. Linked to the ideas of 
national sovereignty and Enlightenment transparency, this included a legal 
state that incorporated the sovereign lawmaking power of parliaments and 
legislatures and the law applying power of courts of national or state 
jurisdiction. This celebrated legal state had a less visible twin: a carceral 
state of surveillance, control, and punishment that operated in theory as an 
adjunct to the legal state but actually as a sibling with its own independent 
sources of power and its own principles. While the legal state focused on 
law breaking, the carceral state hunted abnormalities defined by social and 
economic considerations. While the legal state is generally assumed to be 
superior, a long tradition of empirical studies show this to be false; it is the 
carceral state that has its way with the legal state.122  
This we share with much of the world. What sets us apart and has 
diminished the power of democratic institutions to control the carceral state 
over time, is a historic racing of the carceral state in which this project of 
118 RIOS, supra note 36. 
119 Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013) (arguing that community supervision is part of the reason for excessive 
incarceration and that it should be restricted rather than expanded as part of reform efforts). 
120 The recent public apology by the head of the International Association of Chiefs of Police for 
the role the policing profession played in racial subordination in the U.S. is a healthy example but far 
more needs to follow. 
121 IAN LOADER & RICHARD SPARKS, PUBLIC CRIMINOLOGY? (2011). 
122 This is particularly true of the police who control the flow of cases into the legal system. See 
SKOLNICK, supra note 62. 
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governing abnormality merged with the projects of slavery, colonialism, 
and their afterlives. Our globally leading national embrace of eugenics and 
scientific racism was especially deeply felt in criminal justice, where a 
racial hierarchy of criminal risk became an integral part of the expanded 
carceral state created during the Progressive Era (or what we should call 
the “eugenic” era).123 Some efforts to challenge this raced abnormality in 
the 1960s were quickly squelched in the name of war on crime which soon 
led to yet another and even greater expansion of the carceral state leading 
to mass incarceration.124 
Historically, the less visible nature of the carceral state, and since the 
1960s, its association with a wartime-like sensibility, allowed a racial lag. 
While the rest of the legal and administrative state had to conform to a 
model of formal color blindness, police and prisons, the carceral state, 
could be, indeed according to their own understanding of abnormality, had 
to be, race conscious, race sighted, and race enforcing (all the things that 
color-blind jurisprudence all too quickly condemns in most circumstances).  
President Trump’s election notwithstanding, that era appears to be 
over. The clash between color-blind constitutional values and color-focused 
policing and punishment practices is here to stay. Under the often banal 
expression of criminal justice reform, the power of a largely unaccountable 
carceral state to act on racialized conceptions of abnormality in place for a 
century or more is being challenged as never before. 
123 MUHAMMAD, supra note 55. 
124 HINTON, supra note 68. 
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